

CĀRVĀKA VIEW AS PRESENTED IN NYĀYAMAṢJARĪ (UPTO SECOND ĀHṆIKA OF NYĀYAMAṢJARĪ)

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Abstract

Nyāyamaṣjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa is an encyclopaedic contribution to Indian philosophy. This independent text of *Nyāya-darśana* records the history of India's intellectual tradition of several centuries from the time of Akṣapāda Gautama (2 c A.D.) to Jayantabhaṭṭa's own period (10 c A.D.). The importance of *Nyāyamaṣjarī* lies in its rebuttal of other philosophical tenets and establishing Nyāya philosophy. Although, Jayantabhaṭṭa considers Buddhists as his main opponent, yet he presents the views of Mīmāṃsakas, Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Cārvāka as his opponents on various occasions. In the first two *āhṇikas* (chapter) of *Nyāyamaṣjarī*, he exhibits the views of Cārvākas twice. Firstly, he presents their views while discussing the number of *pramāṇa* and secondly, he presents them as his main opponent while discussing the validity of *anumāna*. Although, Jayantabhaṭṭa has rebutted their views, yet, in this paper, it will be discussed how Jayantabhaṭṭa's polemic text has talked of Cārvākas tenets and reveals some rarely known aspects of Cārvākas *darśana*.

It is a well-known fact that, like other full-fledged systems of Indian philosophy, we do not have a good number of independent texts on the Cārvāka system. The ideas of the philosophical tenets of Cārvāka is known or exposed from the quotations or excerpts or presentation of their views in other texts. In fact, Cārvāka being a pure-materialist and *nāstika*, has been rebutted by almost all the

philosophical schools of Indian philosophy in later period. So, the philosophical tenets of Cārvāka are mainly built upon the presentation of their views as in the sources.

'*Jarannaiyāyika*' Jayantabhaṭṭa's '*Nyāyamaṣjarī*' is a monumental work of Nyāya philosophy. The adjudicate endowment and astonishing presentation of the text have amazed the scholars through the ages. His elaborate and interesting descriptions of all his contemporary schools and scholars in the text with a vivid language has made it an 'Encyclopaedia' of Indian philosophy. Jayantabhaṭṭa, the tenth century scholar of Kashmir lived in a time when none could be recognized as a true scholar unless he had a deep knowledge of three *śāstras* i.e., *pada* (Vyākaraṇa), *vākya* (Mīmāṃsā), *pramāṇa* (Nyāya) and, he was as much at home in Vyākaraṇa or Mīmāṃsā as he was in Nyāya. It is his supreme mastery over all these *śāstras* that gives him the rare courage to assume a lighter vein amidst his serious discussions with some of the best votaries of any one of these branches of knowledge.

In *Nyāyamaṣjarī* (upto the second *āhṇika*), Jayanta presents the view of Cārvākas twice— firstly, he presents their view while dealing with the number of *pramāṇas* and secondly, while discussing the validity of *anumāna*; he considers Cārvākas as his main opponent.

Cārvāka view on number of *pramāṇas* as recorded in *Nyāyamaṣjarī*

In Indian knowledge tradition, there is a difference of opinion regarding the number of *pramāṇas*. According to the Cārvākas, the radical empiricist, *pratyakṣa* is the only valid source of knowledge and all true knowledge arises from it. The Buddhists and Vaiśeṣika hold the view that, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are the two ultimate sources of true knowledge and other sources of knowledge, like, *upamāna* and *śabda*— are included in them. According to Sāṃkhya and Yoga, there are three valid means of knowledge. The

Naiyāyikas are in favour of accepting four independent sources of *pramāṇas*-- *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. The Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā philosophy holds the view that, *arthāpatti* should be accepted as an independent source of knowledge along with these five *pramāṇas*. The Bhāṭṭas and the Vedāntins add *anupalabdhi* to these five and maintain that there are six distinct sources of knowledge. The Paurāṇikas go one step ahead to this and say that, *sambhava* and *aitihya* also are to be recognised as separate sources of knowledge.

Although, Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtra* has not clearly mentioned that the number of *pramāṇas* is four,¹ yet, according to Jayantabhaṭṭa, we can know it from the nature of the expressive power of the words.² The number of *pramāṇas* varies from school to school, but according to Nyāya, all the other means of knowledge can be incorporated under the four *pramāṇas* accepted by them.

Jayantabhaṭṭa strongly condemns the view of Cārvāka on number of *pramāṇa*. Even though, Cārvāka accepts only *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, yet one of the interpreters of *Lokāyatasūtra*, identified as Udbhaṭa by Cakradhara (the commentator of Nyāyamañjarī), says that, it is impossible to fix the number and the definition of *pramāṇa*.³ However, Jayantabhaṭṭa rejects the view of Cārvāka by putting an allegation that, the poor materialist will not be able to comprehend the nature of perception and inference. He further states that, their view that, the number of sources of valid knowledge cannot be fixed up is totally baseless,⁴ since there is not any kind of knowledge which does not depend upon the four means of knowledge. The operation of these four *pramāṇas* incorporate all sorts of *pramā*.

Cakradhara, the author of *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, the only available commentary on *Nyāyamañjarī* clearly indicates the name of Udbhaṭa, a Cārvāka whose view Jayantabhaṭṭa is reproducing at this juncture. Cakradhara also mentions that, Udbhaṭa has composed a commentary on '*Lokāyata-sūtra*'.⁵ That means, the

Cārvāka system should have been widely known by the time of Jayantabhaṭṭa and Cakradhara.

In his commentary on Jayantabhaṭṭa's view on Cārvāka, Cakradhara tries to show that there is a contradiction among the Cārvākas regarding their own view on number of *pramāṇa*.

The *sūtrakāra* of *Lokāyata-sūtra* says something and the commentator Udbhaṭa explains it in a different manner.⁶ For instance, where *sūtrakāra* enlists the name of *tattva* as- '*ṛṥhivī-āpas-tejo-vāyuriti*', there Udbhaṭa comments that, we cannot fix the number of '*tattva*'.⁷ According to the latter, the term-- '*iti*' in the *sūtra* clearly indicates that, the number of *tattva*, cannot be fixed.⁸ Similarly, in case of *pramāṇas* also he tries to mean that, the number of *pramāṇas* also cannot be fixed.

In fact, it would have been more appropriate for Cārvākas if Udbhaṭa had said that, there cannot be any other valid means of knowledge except *pratyakṣa*, instead of saying that number of *pramāṇa* cannot be fixed. It clearly means that, according Udbhaṭa, who is considered as a follower of Cārvāka, there may be some other means of knowledge except *pratyakṣa* even though it has not been mentioned in *Nyāyamaṣjarī* or *Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga*.

Cakradhara informs that, in *Nyāyamaṣjarī*, Jayantabhaṭṭa has used various adjective terms, like, *suśikṣitacārvāka*, *cārvākadhūrta* to mean one and the same person and he is Udbhaṭa. Although, Cakradhara mentions that, Udbhaṭa wrote a *vivṛti* (commentary) on *Lokāyata-sūtra*, but, he has not mentioned the name of Udbhaṭa's commentary.

Nagin J. Shah, the first editor of the text *Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga* identifies this Udbhaṭa of Cārvāka as the rhetorician Udbhaṭa who flourished during the reign of Kashmir king Jayāpīḍa.⁹

Cārvāka view on *anumāna* as recorded in *Nyāyamaṣjarī*

In the second *āhnikā* of *Nyāyamaṣjarī*, while presenting the validity of *anumāna*, Jayantabhaṭṭa presents the view of Cārvāka as his principle opponent. Cārvāka raises objection not only against the validity of inference, but also they allege Naiyāyikas' idea of *vyāpti*, which is the essence of *anumāna*.

The very first argument given by Cārvāka against the validity of *anumāna* is that, the process of *anumāna* is *gauṇa* or **secondary**. According to them, *pramāṇa* produces *niścayātmake-jṣāna* and whatever we know through means of knowledge, i.e., *pratyakṣa* is *niścayātmake* or certain. *Anumāna*, on the contrary being dependent on other means of knowledge, is considered as *gauṇa* or secondary. Therefore, Cārvākas believe that, *anumāna* is only a secondary mean of knowledge, and there is no guarantee that it produces true knowledge.¹⁰

The commentator Cakradhara has thrown some light on this topic. He says that, *pratyakṣa* has prominence, since, without taking recourse to secondary sense, *pratyakṣa* can reveal the meaning.¹¹ The *pramāṇa* which has prominence can produce a *niścayātmake-jṣāna*. Therefore, *pratyakṣa*, being a direct means of knowledge, can produce the knowledge which is certain. On the contrary, *anumāna* being dependent and indirect lacks such validity in generating knowledge. *Pratyakṣa*, being *agaṇa* gives direct access to the world and all other means are indirect. In short, there is direct way of knowing, which is called *pramāṇa* and there is indirect way of knowing, which should not be called as *pramāṇa*. So, *anumāna*, being indirect is not a *pramāṇa* at all.

As a second argument against *anumāna*, Cārvāka seeks to **demolish the idea of *vyāpti***. *Vyāpti* is the essence of *anumāna* on which *anumāna* stands. In *vyāpti*, we know an object in a general way. For instance, in *vyāpti*, we get the knowledge of smokiness and fire-ness in a general way after seeing smoke and fire together in the kitchen so many times and after that, wherever we notice

smoke, the remembrance of *vyāpti* takes place and *anumiti* occurs. But, the opponent objects that there is no concomitance being possible in the case of the *viśeṣa* which shows the relationship between *dhūma* and *vahni* in the mountain or in any other place.¹² That means one infers fire from the smoke in the mountain. But, in such cases, there is no need for inference, for the fact is already proved by perception in the instances of the kitchen. Even if it is argued that it actually proves some particular smoke which is accompanied by particular fire, in that case also, inference is not possible, since the concomitance between mountain-smoke and mountain-fire has not been established. Again, Cārvākas do not accept any reality called *sāmānya*. So, according to them, in general way also *vyāpti* is not possible.¹³

The third argument of the Cārvākas against *anumāna* is that the world is full of a variety of things. All the things have different characters. So, knowing such things which possess distinct features is quite impossible through *anumāna*. In *vyāpti*, we require to prove *sāhacarya* through *anvaya* as well as *vyatireka*. *Vyāptijñāna* becomes the *karaṇa* of *anumiti* when such *sāhacarya* is proved. But, *sāhacarya* is not possible to be a certainty unless there is *vyatireka* also.¹⁴ The *sāhacarya* in case of *anvaya* in any instance, can easily be found, but the *sāhacarya* in the instance of *vyatireka* may not be easily noticed at the same time. If one is missing out of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, then it is not a case of *niyata-sāhacaryatva*. Hence, it is impossible to prove the *vyāpti*. Thus, the opponents establish that, first, **there is no such thing called, *vyāpti*** and secondly, **even if there is *vyāpti*, that cannot be known.**¹⁵

After setting out this *pūrvapakṣa*, Jayantabhaṭṭa has rebutted the views of Cārvāka too and shows various defects in their arguments against the validity of *anumāna*. The process of *anumāna* is not faulty; but, the problem is that, the Cārvāka is unable to catch it properly in the right direction.¹⁶

Cārvāka system, though has lost its validity in due course of time, still, the presentations of Jayantabhaṭṭa and Cakradhara of the Cārvāka views prevalent during their period or known to them have unveiled certain rarely known facts about Cārvākas. If Cārvākas do not accept *anumāna* as a *pramāṇa*, then, they should not talk of its division. It is problematic to justify the position of Cārvāka on the basis of *Nyāyamaṣjarī* alone; but, further study is needed to get more insight into the Cārvāka system.

Notes and References :

- ¹ Pratyakṣa-anumāna-upamāna-śabdāḥ pramāṇāni. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.3
- ² Śabdaśakti svabhāvāt. Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 72. (Mysore Edition)
- ³ Aśakya eva pramāṇa-saṁkhyā-niyama iti suśikṣita-cārvākāḥ. Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 94 & Pramāṇa-prameya-saṁkhyā-lakṣaṇa-niyama-aśakyakaraṇīyatvam... Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 168
- ⁴ Saṁkhyāyā niyamaḥ pramāṇaviśaye nāstītyato nāstikaiḥ. Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 170
- ⁵ Cārvāka-dhūrtastviti- Udbhaṭaḥ. Sa hi lokāyatasūtreṣu vivṛtiṁ kurvan... Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga, p. 43.
- ⁶ ...sūtradvayaṁ yathāśruta-artha-tyāgena-anyathā varṇayāmāsa. Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga, p. 43.
- ⁷ Prathama-sūtre tattvapadena pramāṇa-prameya-saṁkhyā-lakṣaṇa-niyama-aśakya-karaṇīyatām-āha. Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga, p. 43.
- ⁸ ... ya iti-śabdāḥ sa evaṁprāya-prameya-antara-upalakṣaṇatvena tasya-abhimataḥ. Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga, p. 43
- ⁹ '... and to our surprise we find that well-known rhetorician Udbhaṭa is assigned to the period 779-813 A.D. on the basis of the statement of Rājatarāṅgiṇi to the effect that Udbhaṭa was a *sabhāpati*

of King Jayāpīḍa (8 Cent. A.D.) of Kashmira. Thus the date and place of these two Udbhaṭas are one and the same.’ Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga, (Introductory note), p. 7.

- ¹⁰ Prāmānyasya-agaṇatvāt anumānāt-artha-niścayo durlabhah. Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 312.
- ¹¹ Pramāṇam pratyakṣādi agaṇam, upacārānāśrayaṇena tallakṣaṇapadānām vyākhyānāt. Nyāyamaṣjarīgranthibhaṅga, p. 62.
- ¹² Viśeṣa-anugama-abhāvāt sāmānya siddhasādhanāt. Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 313.
- ¹³ Sāmānyadvārako’pi-asti nāvinābhāva-niścayaḥ/ Vāstavaṁ hi na sāmānyam nāma kiṣcana vidyate// Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 314.
- ¹⁴ Niyamaḥ-ca-anumāna-aṅgam ḡhītaḥ pratipadyate/ Grahaṇam ca-sya na-anyatra nāstitā-niścayam vinā// Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 315.
- ¹⁵ Tadevaṁ niyama-abhāvāt sati vā jṣyaptyasāmbhavāt. Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 316.
- ¹⁶ Pramātureva tatra tatra-aparādhah, nānumānasyeti. Nyāyamaṣjarī, p. 325.

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